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INTRODUCTION  
One of the most anticipated decisions of this term will be the three consolidated cases pending in 
front of the Supreme Court, Bostock v. Clayton County, Altitude Express v. Zarda and R.G. & 
G.R. Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC, which collectively present the question of whether Title 
VII’s prohibition on discrimination “because of sex” includes discrimination against gay, lesbian 
and transgender employees. On October 8, 2019, Prof. Pamela Karlan’s oral argument for Zarda 
and Bostock centered around one basic hypothetical: “[W]hen you tell two employees who come 
in, both of whom tell you they married their partner Bill last weekend, when you fire the male 
employee who married Bill and you give the female employee who married Bill a couple of days 
off so she can celebrate the joyous event, that’s discrimination because of sex.”1 The 
hypothetical, which stunned the Justices into a momentarily silence, was meant to demonstrate 
satisfaction of a test canonically enunciated in Manhart.2 As Justice Kagan mentioned to 
opposing counsel, “Manhart gave us a very simple test, and Manhart said, what you do when 
you look to see whether there is discrimination under Title VII is, you say, would the same thing 
have happened to you if you were of a different sex? . . . We have insisted on this extremely 
simple test.”3 
  
The Manhart test, which asks “whether the evidence shows ‘treatment of a person in a manner 
which but for that person’s sex would be different,’”4 is doctrinally referred to as a “but-for” 
causal test for sex discrimination.5 Such counterfactual thought experiments are inherently 
indeterminate as to whether the act/practice is discrimination, and the precise form of the 
counterfactual will always be contested. Defendants argue, for example, that Prof. Karlan’s 
counterfactual involves changing more than just the employee’s sex when we ask if the treatment 
 
1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 7–8, Bostock v. Clayton County, Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda (2019) 
(No. 17-1618, No. 17-1623). 
2 In City of Los Angeles, Dep’t. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), the Los Angeles 
Department of Water and Power conditioned costs for their monthly pension plan on sex, because female 
employees generally had longer life expectancy than their male counterparts. The Court held that the 
policy ran afoul of Title VII, explaining that “[s]uch a practice does not pass the simple test of whether 
the evidence shows ‘treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person’s sex would be 
different.’” (711, quoting Note, Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1170 (1971)).  
3 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 41. 
4 Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711.  
5 We are not claiming either party consistently adheres to one formulation of the test in their arguments. 
See, for example, a slightly different version of Prof. Karlan’s thought experiment in the opening lines of 
oral argument: “When a[n] employer fires a male employee for dating men but does not fire female 
employees who date men, he violates Title VII. The employer, has, in the words of Section 703(a), 
discriminated against the man because he treats that man worse than women who want to do the same 
thing.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 4.  
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would have been different. “[S]ex and sexual orientation are different traits,”6 defendants claim, 
so the latter should be fixed when imagining changes to the former. For this reason, “[t]he 
correct comparison is between a female employee in a same-sex relationship and a male 
employee in a same-sex relationship.”7 Supplying another example, they argue that “the proper 
analysis . . . [for] a neutral policy, such as use [of] the showering facility that corresponds to your 
biological sex, [for] the man who uses the women’s shower, the—the comparator is not a woman 
who uses the woman’s shower. It’s a woman who uses the men’s shower, because otherwise . . . 
you’re not looking at similarly situated people.”8  
 
Although differences in the formulation of the counterfactual yield different normative 
implications, the but-for causal test assumes that sex discrimination can be revealed by 
counterfactually “toggling” the sex features of an individual plaintiff.9 Armed with the right idea 
of what individual features we must change, both sides implicitly claim, we will have the 
capacity to imagine a “similarly situated” person who differs from plaintiff only with respect to 
those features. 
 
These thought experiments sometimes yield what, by our lights, is the right answer to the 
question presented in these cases -- i.e., whether firing someone for being gay or gender 
nonconforming constitutes discrimination because of sex.10 However, the logic of but-for causal 
tests is misguided in a way that limits the reach of antidiscrimination statutes. Although both 
parties’ argumentative strategies are constrained by pre-existing doctrinal formulations that rely 
upon this type of causal reasoning, this article shows that but-for causal tests confuse more than 
clarify a legal inquiry into whether or not something is discriminatory, and they ought to be 
replaced with a more coherent approach. We argue in Section 1 (Negative Argument) that it is a 
mistake to think that we can answer questions of whether or not something is an instance of 
discrimination by asking about individual-level causation (i.e., the but-for causal test), which 
centers inherent traits or attributes of individual plaintiffs. We propose in Section 2 (Positive 
Argument) that social explanation is more appropriate for identifying instances of 
discrimination, as it centers the social generalizations, stereotypes, norms, and expectations 
(hereon “social meanings”) attached to sex categories.   
 
 
6 Id. at 61. See also Brief for Respondent at 7, Bostock v. Clayton County (2019) (No. 17-1618).  
7 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, Bostock v. Clayton County, Altitude Express, Inc. v. 
Zarda (2019) (No. 17-1618, No. 17-1623). 
8 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 49. 
9 In this paper, we use the term “sex features” to refer exclusively to physical features of individuals that 
are associated with male or female reproductive roles. 
10 In the interest of full disclosure two of the authors here submitted an amicus brief in support of the 
employees that were fired on behalf of over seventy philosophers arguing this. See Brief of Philosophy 
Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of the Employees, Bostock v. Clayton County, Altitude Express, 
Inc. v. Zarda, R.G. & G.R Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC (2019) (No. 17-1618, No. 17-1623, No. 
18-107).  
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Beyoncé and Taylor Swift illustrate the difference between individual-level causation and social 
explanation in two separate songs, “If I Were a Boy” and “The Man.”11 Covering similar themes, 
Beyoncé sings: “If I were a boy . . . I’d kick it with who I wanted, and I’d never get confronted 
for it,” and Taylor Swift sings, “[I]f I was a man . . . they wouldn’t shake their heads and 
question how much of this I deserve… What I was wearing, [and] if I was rude could all be 
separated from my good ideas and power moves . . . . [W]e would toast to me, . . . let the players 
play, I’d be just like Leo in Saint-Tropez.” Swift and Beyoncé are not claiming that having male 
sex features per se causes an individual to get away with “kicking it with who [one] wants” or to 
be perceived as a deserving player. Rather, they are telling us that “kicking it with who [one] 
wants” and not getting confronted for it, or being presumed to deserve one’s success and to be a 
player instead of promiscuous is explained by the social categories of sex. That is, the locus of 
explanation for why the “male” versions of Beyoncé and Swift are perceived differently does not 
lie in individual-level features considered apart from the social world, but in social-level roles 
and expectations associated with those features. Failing to recognize this distinction, one might 
mistakenly conclude from Beyoncé’s and Swift’s lyrics that it is something about the individual, 
and not society, that explains the discriminatory outcome. But as Beyoncé’s and Swift’s extent 
body of work explore, the social meanings of sex categories—the generalizations, stereotypes, 
norms and assumptions associated with these categories—really do the explanatory work.12 
 
An allegation of discrimination under Title VII demands an explanation of the type provided by 
Beyoncé and Swift above—i.e., a social explanation. However, while social explanation can tell 
us when social meanings of a category explain an outcome, it alone does not tell us if this 
outcome is wrongful or, more specifically, discriminatory. Answering that question requires a 
normative theory of which sorts of employment practices ought to be tolerated and which ought 
to be disrupted, given that sex categories impose different expectations, norms, roles, etc. onto 
people based on their sex classification. This, we think, is the real debate animating the parties’ 
competing formulations of counterfactuals. The plaintiff-employees hold that a person ought to 
be protected from adverse employment action notwithstanding the fact that they violate 
prevailing stereotypes and expectations regarding (real or presumed) sexual attraction and 
dress/presentation. The defendant-employers hold that they ought to be free to take adverse 
employment action against an employee who violates prevailing stereotypes and expectations 
regarding sexual attractions and dress/presentation. No value-neutral inquiry into causality or 
explanation can settle this disagreement. 
 
 
11 Beyoncé, If I Were a Boy, on I AM...SASHA FIERCE (Columbia 2008); Taylor Swift, The Man, on 
LOVER (Republic 2019). 
12 See, e.g., Beyoncé, LEMONADE (Parkwood, Columbia 2016); Taylor Swift, You Need to Calm Down, 
on LOVER (Republic 2019).  
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NEGATIVE ARGUMENT: AGAINST INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL CAUSAL EXPLANATION 
When judges ask what would have occurred if a female plaintiff had been male, or a male 
plaintiff had been female, they engage in a test for individual-level causal explanation. By that, 
we mean a test that seeks to identify whether an act or practice is discriminatory by asking if it is 
causally explained by the individual plaintiff’s sex features.  
 
Individual-level causation is a concept largely taken from torts. In torts, the law asks about 
whether an isolated event or action caused a particular outcome, or what is sometimes referred to 
as “event” or “token” causation.13 An accident case where D drove his car into V requires us to 
identify if the event of D’s driving as he did was a cause of a distinct later event, namely V’s 
injury. Here, the counterfactual thought experiment is useful, because what we want to know is: 
If D had not thus driven the car, would V not have been injured?14 The candidates for causes are 
what we imagine toggling in the counterfactual world. This is, more generally, how 
counterfactual causal tests work: in order to test whether A caused B, we imagine a 
counterfactual world in which A did not occur, and see whether B still occurred.15 
 
When the law applies this framework to the question of discrimination, it attempts to do 
something similar, but by toggling individuals’ features rather than events. The law asks: In a 
counterfactual world where those features have been altered, would the outcome have been 
different? This framework is inappropriate to the domain of discrimination, which concerns 
questions about social categories, and not isolated features of individuals. Instances of sex 
discrimination, for example, are not explained by individuals’ sex features. Rather, they are 
explained by the social meanings and expectations imposed onto people on the basis of these 
features. A person with male-coded sex features who is fired for having a feminine presentation 
is not fired because of their sex features per se, but because they are viewed as defying the social 
meanings of those features. A man who is fired for having a male partner is not fired because of 
his sex features per se, but because he is viewed as defying social meanings of those features 
(e.g., norms of attraction only to women). And so on. 
 
Although prior work has recognized that these counterfactual thought experiments are 
indeterminate as to the normative question of discrimination, we can explain why that is the 
 
13 CAUSATION AND COUNTERFACTUALS (John Collins, Ned Hall & L.A. Paul eds., MIT Press 2004).  
14 There is significant debate about which competing concept of causation best captures the causal 
relations we should be concerned with in tort cases, and pointing out that these but-for tests are often 
implicitly relying on a very specific contrastive. For excellent discussions, see Jonathan Schaffer, 
Contrastive Causation in the Law, 16 Legal Theory 259 (2010) and Note, Rethinking Actual Causation in 
Tort Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2163 (2017).  
15 (And of course, even when we can easily identify but-for causation in a tort case, that does not settle the 
normative question of liability because both the plaintiff and defendant were usually but-for causes of the 
accident!)  
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case.16  Sex features cannot be isolated from their social meanings. A counterfactual scenario 
wherein an individual has different sex features sneaks in these social meanings and, with them, 
the substantive significance of the individual’s other attributes/behaviors relative to prevailing 
sex-specific norms and expectations. Anytime we imagine changing just the “trait” of sex (we 
assume they imagine the “trait” of sex consists in a person’s reproductive sex features, e.g., 
changing a penis to a vagina), but hold constant the complained of trait (e.g., “wearing a dress” 
or “presumed sexual attractions to males”), we are necessarily changing the meaning of the trait 
in light of the sex features (now, for example, the person is gender conforming with respect to 
sexuality and dress).17 These examples illustrate a more general truth: how these counterfactuals 
are formulated is a conceptual judgment call with normative implications. This is precisely why 
such thought experiments are inherently indeterminate, and why the parties and Justices spent so 
much time fighting about the details of the relevant counterfactual.18 We cannot change the traits 
that make someone a member of a given sex category without also changing the social meanings 
and expectations imposed on that person. This, in turn, changes the substantive significance of 
their other attributes. 
 
This point illuminates the central flaw with the defendants’ arguments in Zarda, Bostock, and 
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes. Defendants argue that the appropriate, “similarly situated” 
comparator to use in the but-for test is someone of the opposite sex who violates the gender 
stereotypes of that sex.19 The amicus for the Trump Department of Justice argues that a 
counterfactual in which we imagine a female employee attracted to females were instead a male 
employee attracted to females would “change[] both the sex (from female to male) and sexual 
 
16 See, e.g., David Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 
(1989). And as Justice Breyer has pointed out, “It is one thing to require a typical tort plaintiff to show 
‘but-for’ causation. In that context, reasonably objective scientific or commonsense theories of physical 
causation make the concept of ‘but-for’ causation comparatively easy to understand and relatively easy to 
apply. But it is an entirely different matter to determine a ‘but-for’ relation when we consider, not 
physical forces, but the mind-related characterizations that constitute motive.” Gross v. FBL Fin. 
Services, Inc. 557 U.S. 167, 190 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
17 Said another way, when the employers insist that “sex and sexual orientation are different traits,” they 
fail to understand that the specific value of the former is precisely what determines if the value of the 
latter is considered normative or non-normative of social expectations. See supra note 6 and 
accompanying text. 
18 This also explains why we see a strange mix match in how the counterfactuals are trotted out and in 
what level of strictness regarding the other features that travel with the category swap depending on the 
question at hand. For example, conservatives don’t like very narrow counterfactuals in the context of sex 
discrimination because they sweep in conduct they think is not discriminatory such as sex-segregated 
bathrooms or locker rooms; but they do like them in the context of race discrimination because they 
sweep in conduct they think is discriminatory like affirmative action. 
19 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 49; Brief for Petitioners at 9, Altitude Express, 
Inc. v. Zarda (2019) (No. 17-1623) (“To isolate sex, Zarda (a man attracted to the same sex) must be 
compared to a lesbian woman (a woman attracted to the same sex). Because employers that base 
decisions on employees’ sexual attraction would treat both Zarda and the lesbian comparator the same 
way, the comparator analysis reveals no sex discrimination. Neither sex is favored over the other.”).  
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orientation (from gay to straight)” of that employee. “A proper comparison,” they maintain, 
“would change the sex while holding the sexual orientation constant. Only a relative difference 
in treatment in that scenario would constitute sex discrimination.”20 And defendant R.G. & G.R. 
Harris Funeral Homes argues:  
 
It is only when a court is “scrupulous about holding everything constant except the 
plaintiff’s sex” that the comparator analysis can “do its job of ruling in sex discrimination 
as the actual reason for the employer’s decision.” A women who identifies as a woman 
not only has a different sex (female) than Stephens, but also a different transgender status 
(nontransgender). Such a comparison cannot show sex discrimination.21  
 
Clearly, none of these examples are “scrupulous[ly] [] holding everything constant except the 
plaintiff’s sex.” To the contrary, in order to hold constant the complained of conduct—here, 
sexuality or identity-based gender nonconformity—they counterfactually change the plaintiff’s 
sex features as well as their preferred sexual partners or gender identity. The but-for causal 
inquiry is not an independent test of discrimination; it is an expression of one’s normative priors 
about what is discriminatory/wrongful vis-a-vis sex categories. The defendants insist on the 
counterfactual specification that maintains the plaintiffs’ noncompliant relationships to gender 
norms because they believe that, for example, firing a masculine-presenting woman is not 
discriminatory on the grounds that a similarly gender nonconforming man (i.e., a feminine-
presenting man) also would have been fired.22  
 
The defendants attempt to obscure these normative priors with a sleight of hand that changes 
how abstractly the counterfactual adjustments are described. Rather than hold fixed individual 
features (e.g. “sexual attraction to males”, “female gender identity”), they hold fixed relational 
features (e.g., “sexual orientation”, “transgender”) that in turn hold constant the plaintiff’s gender 
nonconformity.23 Such stacking the deck by manipulating the counterfactual just proves our 
point, which is that individual-level traits cannot explain why a gay or transgender employee was 
fired. The defendants recognize that social-level expectations about dress, presentation, 
 
20 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 7, at 19.  
21 Brief for the Petitioner at 26–27, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC (2019) (No. 18-
107) (citing Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 366 (7th Cir. 2017) (Sykes, J., 
dissenting)).   
22 See id. at 36–37 (describing how an employer’s “belief about transgender status is not sex-specific” 
because “it applies equally to all men and women”); see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, 
at 53 (“So if you treat all . . . gay men and women exactly the same regardless of their sex, you’re not 
discriminating against them because of their sex.”); Brief for Petitioners, supra note 19, at 9.  
23 See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 21, at 3 (“It is also wrong to say that the proper comparator 
for Stephens is a biological female who wants to dress as a female. Stephens is a transgendered biological 
male, so the proper comparator is a transgendered biological female. Changing the comparator’s sex and 
transgender status fails to demonstrate that Harris treats male employees differently than similarly 
situated female employees. It is a shell game—not a tool for statutory construction.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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sexuality, etc. are responsible, and this is why they insist on holding plaintiffs’ gender 
nonconformity fixed, rather than their sexual attraction to males or female gender identity. 
POSITIVE ARGUMENT: IN FAVOR OF SOCIAL EXPLANATION 
The tangle of counterfactual thought experiments is not mysterious at all once we recognize that 
the statuses that Title VII forbids from being the basis of discrimination do not consist in merely 
individual features (i.e., ones that mark a person as an instance of a kind of sex, race, religion, 
and so on). Rather, they consist in memberships in social categories—categories brimming with 
often nefarious social meanings. It is, in fact, the purpose of antidiscrimination law to revise 
these nefarious meanings, and to protect individuals from discrimination on the basis of these 
meanings. When the Supreme Court recognizes that, for example, firing a woman for “being 
aggressive” could be an instance of sex discrimination, it is precisely because they recognize that 
the explanation for the firing was not merely due to that individual’s sex features, much less 
merely due to her “being aggressive.” What makes the act discriminatory is the relevance of 
acting on the basis of her “being aggressive” in light of the social meanings of female sex—
particularly, the norm that females ought not to be aggressive.24 Therefore, we argue that instead 
of individual-level causal explanation, social explanation is better suited as a test for legal 
discrimination.  
 
Nothing in the text or history of Title VII requires us to approach a discrimination case by asking 
about individual-level causation, and doing so simply confuses two different meanings of the 
word “because” in the statutory text.25 The sentence “V is injured because D drove into him” 
uses “because” in the individual-level causal sense.26 The sentence: “I went to Mass on Sunday 
because I am Catholic,” by contrast, uses “because” in the sense of a social explanation. Going 
to Mass was not caused by my Catholicism as an individual-level trait, but rather, due to my 
relationship to a set of associated social meanings (e.g. the norm of attending institutionalized 
 
24 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989). 
25 Conflating social explanation and individual-level causation is not limited to the law; we see the same 
practice in social science and en vogue causal modeling in computer science. For a discussion see, for 
example, Lily Hu & Issa Kohler-Hausmann, What’s Sex Got to Do with Machine Learning? 2020 PROC. 
CONF. ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, & TRANSPARENCY 513. 
26 See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text. 
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liturgical rituals).27 The explanatory work, in short, is done by a set of background (usually 
unstated) sociological understandings about the meaning of these categories.28  
 
Our positive argument is simply that Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination “because of 
sex” calls for a social explanation, and not an individual-level explanation, for an instance of 
discrimination. A social explanation of an instance of sex discrimination asks whether the social 
categories that the individuals are members of, rather than individuals’ sex features per se, 
explain the outcome in question. The full inquiry has three components. First, we need to 
determine the social meanings of sex categories. Second, we need to know if the complained-of 
act or practice is explained by something about those meanings. And finally, we need to know if 
it is wrongful in the way that Title VII prohibits. In a short essay, we can only gesture at how 
best to approach these three inquiries.  
 
First, how do we determine the social meanings of the relevant social categories? That is, how do 
we know which generalizations and norms of presentation, behaviors, roles, affect, etc. are 
associated with the categories “male” and “female”? This is a complex sociological question, but 
one that is essential to answer before we can know if the act/practice was because of sex. 
Interestingly, here is a place where counterfactual thought experiments are useful. When we 
imagine changing someone’s sex category, holding constant a specific presentation, behavior, 
role, or affect, and then conclude that the act/practice would have turned out differently, we learn 
that the features held constant are sexed—that is, they are evaluated in light of sex’s social 
meanings. But these tests can’t be mechanically applied because it is possible that toggling an 
employee’s sex would not change the outcome, and that this outcome was nevertheless “because 
. . . of sex” (imagine, for example, an employer who fires both male and female employees who 
display the qualities of being emotive, sensitive, and caring at the workplace, because he 
devalues qualities he deems “effeminate”). There will always be some armchair sociology and 
anthropology involved in this first inquiry. But it is important to be clear that we are doing 
armchair social science about the social meanings and relations of sex categories, and not about 
causal explanations.  
 
 
27 Being Catholic is not an individual-level trait that can be identified only by reference to things inherent 
to me; it is a trait I can only have in relation to things that exist in the social world. In a parallel world 
where there is no organized “Catholic” religion, I could not go to church “because I am Catholic”—nor is 
it clear the structure I would go to would be called a “church”—even if I held identical cosmological 
beliefs and enact the same physical movements that we know of as Catholic rituals. “Catholic” is a social 
category that is partially constituted by a set of social-level facts, such as institutionalized liturgical 
rituals. I appeal to those social-level facts in order to explain why, being a member of that category, I 
participate in those specific rituals and not others. 
28 By “sociological understandings”, we mean “culturally shared concepts, beliefs, and other attitudes that 
enable us to interpret and organize information and coordinate action, thought, and affect.” Sally 
Haslanger, What Is a (Social) Structural Explanation?, 173 PHIL. STUD. 113, 126 (2016). 
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Second, once we know the social meanings of sex categories, we need to know if the 
complained-of act/practice is explained by these meanings. To say that the outcome must be 
“explained by” these meanings could entail various relations. It could mean that a decisionmaker 
appeals to something about the category to justify his reason for action, or that generalizations 
about the group explain patterns of opportunities and selection. For example, in Price 
Waterhouse the employer appealed to the fact that the plaintiff cursed and did not wear makeup 
as a reason for denying her a promotion;29 and in R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, the 
employer explicitly points to presentation as the justification for the termination.30 But in these 
cases, the employer did not object to “not wearing makeup” or “wearing skirts” as such, but 
rather objected to these things for some types of people. In other words, they took these features 
to be reasons for action because they were deemed inappropriate, given the norms associated 
with the relevant sex category. Alternatively, an unfavorable employment outcome might be 
“explained by sex” in the sense that general truths concerning the arrangements, roles, or 
practices associated with a sex category cause the complained-of policy to produce that 
outcome.31 For example, a prohibition on promoting employees who have never missed work or 
been late will cause women to be disadvantaged, and this is due to social-level arrangements and 
roles that assign more caregiving work to female persons.  
Lastly, just as but-for causation can narrow potential parties to a tort action, but not assign 
liability, social explanation can tell us when the social meanings of sex categories explain an 
outcome, but cannot alone tell us if this outcome is wrongful, or, more specifically, 
discriminatory. What one needs for this final step is an independent normative theory about 
which of which social meanings are nefarious and contribute to systematic inequality. While we 
don’t have space to defend such a theory here, we emphasize that one can't escape the need for 
some substantive principle to distinguish between when an outcome is wrongful and when it is 
not. One can’t get away with saying that any outcome that is explained by the social meanings of 
 
29 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989). 
30 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 21, at 2 (“Stephens handed [her employer] a letter . . . announc[ing] 
that Stephens had decided to start presenting and dressing as a woman at work . . . . In the end, [the 
employer] could not agree to Stephens’s plan to violate the dress code, so he offered Stephens a 
severance.”).  
31 A careful reader might notice that an implication of our position is the collapse of disparate impact and 
treatment, as both are instances where of the category “explains” the outcome. We cannot expand, much 
less defend, that position in this short paper. But we will point out that it is an upshot of our ontological 
position, which is that whenever one is acting on sex as such (say by categorically excluding all people 
sex-coded female) one is acting on a category that is constituted by social meanings and relations, and 
when one is acting on one of the constitutive meanings or relations of sex, one is acting on sex. Therefore, 
there is no distinction between disparate impact and treatment to be had on the basis of the former acting 
on sex per se, and the latter acting on something that is not-sex but merely correlated by it.  See also, Issa 
Kohler-Hausmann, Eddie Murphy and the Dangers of Counterfactual Causal Thinking About Detecting 
Racial Discrimination, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1163 (2019). 
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a sex category is discriminatory without saying more about why this is so.32 And this requires a 
normative principle—in particular, one that recognizes that any norm against discrimination on 
the basis of a given social category must be seeking to remake the social meanings associated 
with that category in some way. Why else would we prohibit discriminating on the basis of sex, 
but not shoe size, if we did not think that there was good reason to interrupt the reproduction of 
certain generalizations, stereotypes, and norms associated with the categories “male” and 
“female”? There is no way to determine which of these social meanings should be remade in the 
absence of substantive normative commitments. While one person might think that (e.g.) sex-
specific dress codes reinforce nefarious meanings of sex, another might that that these social 
meanings are innocuous. Both positions are consistent with a social explanation of why a 
masculine presenting woman was fired, but they differ as to whether this action counts as 
discriminatory.  
It is here we get to the real heart of the matter in the pending Zarda, Bostock, and R.G. & G.R. 
Harris Funeral cases. Which social meanings of sex categories ought Title VII disrupt? The 
defendants understand better than anyone that if norms and expectations about things like 
sexuality and gender presentation change, the meaning of sex in our society will change.33 
Precisely what the courts must decide, then, is which of the limits, expectations, norms, and roles 
imposed on the basis of sex classification ought to be tolerated and which ought to be changed. 
The statutory text does not give any guidance on this normative question. But we ought to be 
 
32 For example, the entire debate about affirmative action is best understood as a debate about whether or 
not it is fair and just to engage in some kind of admission rule that is unquestionably “explained by” sex 
or race.  
33 For example, defendants argue that acceptance of the employees’ arguments would create “Title VII 
protection whenever employees refuse to ‘conform’ to what they consider to be ‘a normative sex-based 
stereotype.’ [This] would empower employees who reject sex-based norms—even well-established, non-
invidious ones—to antagonize employers. Male attorneys may insist on ‘wear[ing] nail polish and 
dresses’ to court hearings; female swim instructors may put on fake beards or ‘strip to the waist’ at work; 
and their employers would be helpless to stop them.” Brief for Petitioners, supra note 19, at 57. See also 
id. at 54–55 (“[A]dopting the analytical underpinnings of Zarda’s argument will revolutionize the 
meaning of sex discrimination in the workplace and product staggering, indefensible outcomes[,] . . . 
“overthrow[ing] . . . sex-specific policies for determining access to living facilities, sleeping quarters, 
restrooms, showers, and locker rooms; fitness tests for police, fire, and similar positions; and 
organizational dress and grooming standards.”); Brief for National Organization for Marriage and Center 
for Constitutional Jurisprudence as Amicus Curiae at 11–12, Bostock v. Clayton County, Altitude 
Express, Inc. v. Zarda, R.G. & G.R Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC (2019) (No. 17-1618, No. 17-
1623, No. 18-107) (“As should be obvious, the gender identity claimants are therefore seeking not just a 
minor adjustment to the civil rights laws, but a fundamental shift in policy and rejection of ‘common 
sense [and] decency’ that is inherent in the judicially-recognized fundamental right to bodily privacy from 
observation by persons of the opposite sex.”). 
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12 
honest that this question—and not a metaphysical question about causality—is what we 
fundamentally are debating in these cases. 
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